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Abstract 
 This study attempts to explore the evolution of the Arab Development Aid and 
contextualizes the Arab model of development aid vis-à-vis the DAC Model and the Southern 
Model shedding light on its transforming characteristics. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been among the most active donors 
in the world, with official development assistance (ODA) averaging 1.5 percent of their 
combined gross national income (GNI) during the period 1973-2008, more than twice the 
United Nations target of 0.7 percent and five times the average of the OECD-DAC 
countries339. This paper approaches this model of development aid by focusing on: the 
changing nature of multilateral development framework and the rising role of emerging 
economies in the aid system; the basic tenets of the Arab aid development model and its 
current composition and characteristics; the challenges and future prospects for the Arab 
development aid and its potential role in engendering better governance mechanisms in the 
Arab region and globally with a case study on the case of the Qatar Development Fund. 
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Introduction 
 Since the 1970s, Arab states have asserted themselves as prolific and generous donors 
of foreign aid.  Led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Arab donors have been among the most active international donors, with 
official development assistance (ODA) averaging 13 percent of global ODA during the period 
1973-2008 (Walz and Ramachandran, 2011, p. 12). Indeed, Arab donors have some of the 
most well-established aid programs in the world, and have consistently provided recipients 
with an alternative to DAC donor financing. While, Arab donors have become central 
proponents of South-South Cooperation (SSC), providing almost 75 percent of non-DAC 
ODA from 1973-2008, clear differences between Arab donor modalities and both Southern 
                                                          
338 Co-Lead Project investigator for the National Priority Research Program, funded by Qatar National Research Fund, ID#6-1272-5-160. 
339 ODA is defined by OECD as financial assistance meeting the following four criteria: (i) provided to a developing country or an ODA-
eligible multilateral organization; (ii) on concessional terms with a grant element of at least 25 percent; (iii) for a development purpose and 
(iv) by official agencies. Data on ODA flows are reported to DAC annually by a focal agency within each of the Gulf countries. In 1970, the 
United Nations called on countries to give a minimum of 0.7% of their GNI as official development assistance in UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2626 of 24 October 1970. As Adelman and Spantchak (2013, forthcoming) indicated, total ODA flows have been steadily 
increasing since the 1960s. While there was a decline only in real terms during the 1990s recession, in 2010, ODA picked up again by 
exceeding $128 billion - hitting historical records. 
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and DAC models has characterized Arab aid as a unique branch of the international ODA 
flora and has raised questions surrounding the location of Arab aid in relation to alternate 
modalities (Waltz and Ramachandran, 2011, p. 12). 
Prefaced against the background of a rapidly changing international system, this study 
attempts to explore the effectiveness of Arab development aid and contextualizes the Arab 
model of development aid vis-à-vis the DAC Model and the Southern Model.  A critical task 
we aim to undertake in this study is to position the Arab development aid in relation to other 
existing models of aid and shed light on its changing and transforming peculiarities, and 
characteristics. . 
We approach the Arab model of development aid by taking into account the changing 
and transforming character of the global multilateral development framework. This study will 
focus exclusively on ODA flows and evaluate the Arab development aid by taking into 
consideration the changing patterns and dynamics in ODA globally. While we recognize that 
ODA is no longer the primary form of development financing, as private flows and 
investment have increasingly outweighed global volumes of ODA, (Adelman and Spantchak, 
2013 [forthcoming]), the strategic and political considerations that accompany ODA and the 
centrality of ODA within the Arab model of development assistance, justifies the use of ODA 
as the central feature through which to discuss Arab aid. The use of ODA, however, should 
not be seen as the ultimate aim, as we argue that historicity of ODA is comprised of 
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. This study attempts to link ODA and implementation of 
better governance mechanisms in national contexts. The discussion on the Paris Declaration 
and Accra Agenda will clearly indicate the possible avenues of articulation between ODA and 
governance, which is often seen as a missing link in the literature. As UNCTAD’s latest 
meeting in Doha (May 2012) presented the motto “more inclusive development”, we argue 
that ODA has more potential and capability to foster  better governance mechanisms. In 
addition, we focus on the case of the Qatar Development Fund, as Qatar had allocated 
$10,862,361,353 in Governmental aid, and $4,278,126,789 in Non-Governmental aid during 
the period 2006-2012 (Qatar Foreign Aid Report 2012). 
 
Section One - Changing Nature of Multilateral Development Framework and the Rise of 
Emerging Economies  
 The World Bank reports show that aid has been essential to helping low-income 
countries accelerate economic growth and lift people out of extreme poverty over the last few 
decades. For many developing countries, ODA—and the reforms it supports—needs to 
continue to be a stable source of development financing; especially for the poorest economies 
and fragile states with limited or no access to capital markets. It represents the biggest 
financial inflow to fragile states, after remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI). ODA 
is expected to remain a critical input to achieve the new development goals (World Bank 
Group Report, 2013). 
Similar to the case of DAC donors, non-DAC states drivers of aid-giving, and 
humanitarian assistance in particular, have reflected wider political and ideological interests 
or concerns. These political origins can be traced back a long way; in particular, the formation 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s played a catalytic role in the formulation 
of a rationale for assistance between developing countries. The principles of the NAM – 
especially respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in other 
countries’ domestic affairs – have shaped the way for many non-DAC donors to conceive of 
their support. These principles remain important today – for instance, they inform the G-77’s 
criticism of Western governments’ adoption of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a way of 
furthering broader political ambitions (Adele Harmer and Lin Cotterrell, 2005). 
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The multilateral space that provides the backdrop for donors to function has recently 
begun to change as the (re)emergence340 of new donors and the recent surge in South-South 
Cooperation has challenged the traditional norms that previously defined the multilateral 
development framework. Throughout the last decade, non-DAC donors have significantly 
increased aid spending. Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, 
selfish aid motives and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of 
new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. On the other 
hand, new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently)341 may have competitive 
advantages in allocating aid according to need and merit (Dreher Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; 
Thiele, Rainer, 2010). 
In 2008, South-South aid flows were valued at $15.3 billion, an amount composing 
approximately 9.5 percent of total global development cooperation (UNDP, 2011 p. 147). 
Other estimates place aid levels from non-DAC donors between 8 and 31 percent of global 
ODA, with four non-DAC donors (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, China and 
Venezuela) reaching the official UN aid target of 0.7 percent of GNI – a benchmark that 18 of 
23 DAC donors consistently fail to reach (Walzand Ramachandran, 2011, p. 1). As aid from 
traditional donors begins to decline in the aftermath of the financial crisis, emerging donors 
are asserting themselves as alternate providers of development financing, widening their stake 
in development efforts while presenting an approach to development that clearly breaks from 
previous global norms (World Bank Group Report, 2013). 
Ideologically, the multilateral development space is governed by the five principles 
that compose the current international agenda for aid effectiveness.  Formalized in 2005 via 
the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, global efforts towards improving the efficiency of 
foreign aid have become associated with the adoption and inclusion of ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability within global aid practices 
(OECD, 2005).  As a follow up to earlier High-Level Forums on Harmonization in Rome 
(2003) and on Development Results in Marrakech (2004), the Paris meeting on aid 
effectiveness became the sight of the development of the first practical and action-oriented 
roadmap to improve the quality of foreign aid (OECD, 2005).  
In 2008, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to the Paris 
Declaration in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), a new aid effectiveness agreement that 
aimed to strengthen and deepen the implementation of the Paris targets (OECD, 2012). The 
AAA suggested that advancement towards the Paris targets could be improved through 
increasing recipient ownership over coordination and formation of aid policies, fostering 
partnerships that offer greater participation to all development actors including civil society as 
well as official development partners, and by ensuring that aid is clearly focused towards the 
achievement of real and measureable results.  In addition, the AAA also emphasized the 
importance of ‘capacity development’ as a key feature of efforts towards aid effectiveness, 
advocating that donors and recipients should work together to improve the ability for 
recipients to manage their own futures.  
Using the foundation established in past aid effectiveness forums, the 2011 High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, broadened the previous effectiveness agenda by 
shifting the international focus away from ‘aid’ and towards ‘development cooperation’. In 
essence, the forum in Busan helped to realign the international development sphere to one that 
acknowledged the changing development landscape and that sought to become more widely 
applicable to development efforts pursued by non-state development partners, and through 
                                                          
340 According to Kragelund (2008), the so-called ‘emerging’ donor countries are not necessarily new to the aid environment, with aid 
programs from several ‘emerging’ donors dating back to the 1960s.  However, a recent surge in aid activity from strengthening Southern 
economic powers has increased the international presence of Southern aid spending and contributed to the so-called ‘rise’ of ‘emerging’ 
powers.  
341 There are some countries who were recipients and they become recipient and donors, such as Brazil, India, Turkey, China and South 
Africa. There some other countries who were recipients and become donors, such as South Korea ( see more in: 
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/country-profiles) 
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South-South and triangular forms of cooperation.  In acknowledging that different modalities 
of development creates different responsibilities from those that govern traditional North-
South efforts, the conference in Busan forged a new global development partnership that 
sought to embrace the new diversity of the developmental space through recognizing and 
fostering the unique roles that different stakeholders can play to support global development 
(OECD, 2011). While the meeting in Busan marked a clear shift in the international 
development architecture, emphasizing broader calls for cooperation towards sustainable 
development and facilitating the inclusion of non-state development actors within the 
development paradigm, the foundational principles underlying the new development 
framework remain rooted in the principles that defined the aid effectiveness agenda according 
to the Paris Declaration.  
The shift towards ‘development cooperation’ in Busan was partly driven by recent 
changes to the international development space.  In conjunction with the ‘reemergence’ of 
non-DAC donors, the proliferation of new development actors – NGOs, private 
philanthropists, and multilateral agencies – has raised fears of that the multilateral system is 
suffering from increasing fragmentation (Reisen, 2010). Given that many new development 
actors do not directly engage with the multilateral system, the rising number of agencies 
promises to increase the challenges associated with overlapping mandates, complex funding 
arrangements, and conflicting monitoring programs, creating a multilateral development space 
that is confused, incoherent, and directly at odds with efforts towards aid effectiveness. 
While the number of actors within the multilateral sphere is on the rise, the amount of 
aid allocated to multilateral institutions appears to be stagnating.  Indeed, from 2001 to 2009, 
core contributions to multilateral institutions declined from 33 percent to 28 percent (OECD-
DAC, 2011, p. 5). At the same time, donors have increasingly substituted core contributions 
to multilateral agencies for earmarked spending allocated through multilateral institutions in a 
process termed the ‘bi-lateralization’ of multilateral aid (Sagasti, 2005). This trend towards 
earmarking, where donors channel funds through multilateral institutions for specific regional 
or sector programs, appears to have quickened with the international emphasis on result-based 
programming, as the need for bilateral donors to justify aid spending through claiming results 
has perpetuated a system of flag-planting within the multilateral sphere.  While the ability for 
the multilateral system to channel bi-lateralized aid flows into a coherent and harmonized 
development agenda remains unclear, the rising amount of earmarked spending, which grew 
to 12 percent of total ODA in 2009, threatens to deepen fragmentation within the multilateral 
system by further entrenching bilateral priorities into multilateral development actions 
(OECD-DAC, 2011, p. 28). 
In addition to the proliferation of new development actors, the number of multilateral 
agencies that define the international development space has also grown.  Rising from 15 key 
multilateral agencies in 1940 to over 260 by 2008, the creation of new multilateral players has 
partly been aligned with the rise of emerging powers (Reisen, 2010).  Indeed, recent debates 
suggests that the un-representativeness of the current multilateral system, which remains 
dominated by Bretton Woods institutions that afford little decision-making authority to 
emerging political and economic power, has led such powers to actively avoid the traditional 
multilateral sphere in search of new multilateral spaces that are free of Western influence and 
provide a space for South-South development cooperation.  
In the absence of meaningful reform within the traditional multilateral system, 
emerging donors have pursued spaces free of western influence or avoided the multilateral 
system all together.  While China and India have tended to limit multilateral interactions, 
opting to provide aid bilaterally in efforts to maintain greater policy independence, South 
Africa and Brazil have been more open to collaboration with multilateral organizations and 
each other (Walz and Ramachandran, 2011).  Indeed, recent estimates suggest that both Brazil 
and South Africa have allocated almost 75 percent of their aid spending through multilateral 
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agencies (Walz and Ramachandran, 2011, p. 19; Zimmerman and Smith, 2011, p. 727).  
However, such aid tends to be channeled towards Southern-led regional financial and 
developmental institutions over traditional western multilaterals, in efforts to enhance 
Southern ownership over regional development processes and to maintain relative control and 
decision-making process over multilaterally distributed funds (see Burrall, 2007; Griffith 
Jones et al. 2008; Corrasco et al. 2007).  The establishment of Southern-based multilateral 
arrangements, such as the G77 plus China, the African Economic Community, and IBSA 
(India-Brazil-South Africa), has not only created a space for developing countries and 
emerging donors to assert control over development decision-making, but has also provided 
an outlet for developing countries to pursue development that is more transparent, 
participatory, accountable, and targeted towards the specific needs of developing countries 
(African Regional Meeting 2010).  
Indeed, the rise of emerging donors as providers of development finance has begun to 
change the rules of the traditional aid game.  Guided by the principles of mutual benefit and 
solidarity between developing countries, emerging donors aid practices tend to reject the use 
of political and economic conditionalities in favor of a non-interventionist approach to aid 
programming (Woods, 2008).  While some contend that this ‘hands-off’ approach to aid 
financing may hinder prior efforts to increase international standards, particularly towards 
governance and environmental protections, and may encourage poor policies, unsustainable 
borrowing, and support for ‘rouge states’ (see Naim, 2007), others have suggested that the 
alternative approach provided by emerging donors has increased competitive pressure within 
the aid system and has served to weaken the bargaining power of traditional donors (Woods, 
2008). Although the alternatives to traditional aid provided through the rise of new donors and 
South-South aid flows present challenges to the prevailing and outdated logic that tends to 
govern traditional aid practices in both the bilateral and multilateral spheres, there is little 
evidence to suggest that emerging donors are overtly trying to overturn the present 
multilateral system.   
 
Section Two: Basic Tenets and Characteristics of Arab Development Aid 
 Amidst the changing multilateral system, where new development actors are playing 
an increasing role in the provision of development assistance, clear trends have formed around 
the aid modality preferences adopted by non-DAC bilateral donors. According to 
Zimmermann and Smith (2011), apart from the OECD DAC, these donors can be categorized 
into three different strands of development cooperation providers. Zimmerman and Smith’s 
first model of aid is provided by ‘emerging donors.’  This category tends to be composed of 
new member states of the European Union, Turkey, Israel and Russia, which adopt the 
institutional, regulatory and legal structures of these countries that resemble those of DAC 
donors.342 The second mode of aid giving is the ‘southern’ model, which primarily 
encompasses the developing countries which provide aid, both in the form of financial aid and 
expertise to the other developing countries, and are the country’s most commonly associated 
with SSC, notably Brazil, China, India and South Africa.343 These countries are generally both 
donors and recipients of ODA and participate in SSC through Southern dominated multilateral 
organizations such as IBSA, etc. According to Zimmermann and Smith, Arab donors 
constitute the third model. Countries such as Kuwait344, Saudi Arabia345 and United Arab 
                                                          
342 Those that are EU members are in tandem with EU principles and commitments. They have committed to increase their net ODA volumes 
to 0.17% of gross national income (GNI) by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015. 
343 SSC providers cannot be categorized as "donors" and others "recipients" as they label themselves as peers in mutually-beneficial 
relationships with their partner countries. Exchange of technical skills (e.g. through technical assistance, training or scholarships) constitutes 
an integral element of SSC and also providers generally do not attach policy conditions to co-operation. It is often argued that technical co-
operation from SSC providers respects the priorities of partner countries (OECD, 2010). 
344 In 2009, Kuwait’s official development assistance (ODA) was equal to 0.2% of Kuwait’s gross national income (GNI). In 2011, Kuwait 
was the 38th largest donor of official humanitarian aid. 86.4% of Kuwait’s official humanitarian aid was spent in fragile states in 
2011..87.1% of Kuwait’s official humanitarian aid was spent on long term humanitarian recipients. 
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Emirates346 have been visible actors in development aid with donor status. Furthermore, 
Qatar347, as an emerging donor is becoming more and more visible in the international aid 
architecture (Qatar Foreign Aid Report, 2012). 
Perhaps, the most obvious characteristic of Arab development aid has been its 
generosity when compared to other mechanisms of international aid. A World Bank study 
entitled “Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation” clearly illustrated the 
generousity of Arab donors. Arab donors— most importantly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have been among the most generous 
even in the global standards, with official development assistance (ODA) reaching about 1.5 
percent of the combined gross national income (GNI). During the period 1973-1990, Arab aid 
as a share of GDP was more than twice the United Nations target of 0.7 percent and five times 
the average of the OECD-DAC countries. (Rouis, 2010; Rouis, 2011; Shushan and Marcoux, 
2011; AFESD, 2011).  While flows of Arab aid as a share of GDP decreased from 1990-2008, 
Arab donors continued to meet the UN target of 0.7% throughout the 1990s, and were almost 
twice as generous as OECD-DAC donors from 2000-2008. According to Neumayer, Arab 
donors have never been proactive in advancing the debate on the proper objectives and design 
of development aid. Whereas the OECD-DAC has produced one document after the other on 
how aid should be designed in order to promote poverty alleviation, sustainable development, 
environmental protection, gender equality, violent conflict prevention, local ownership, 
effective partnership with recipient countries, good governance, etc., no similar engagement 
with such topics can be discerned from Arab donors. (Neumayer, Eric , 2002). However, 
according to McKinnon, the one, but rather limited exception is the Kuwait Fund, which has 
always assumed the role of a pioneer amongst Arab donors. It stresses that the promotion of 
sustainable development is one of its key aims and that it has insisted on the inclusion of an 
environmental study in each project report from as early as the mid-1980s onwards 
(McKinnon 1997). 
While ODA from OECD-DAC donors has begun to stagnate in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis, Arab aid was not as harshly affected as initially expected (Rouis, 2011). 
In relation to the global financial crisis (2008–2009), official development assistance (ODA) 
from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE significantly increased in both relative and absolute 
terms (Rouis, 2011). The relative share of KSA, UAE and Kuwait almost doubled during the 
two-year crisis period, as opposed to the two years preceding the crisis, rising to 3.9 percent 
from 2.1 percent (Rouis, 2011). Furthermore, as the financial and economic crisis unfolded 
during the course of 2008-2010, Arab financial institutions increased their attention and 
activities especially to infrastructure sectors such as transportation, energy, and water 
(AFESD, 2011). As Rouis (2011) indicates, financial assistance dedicated to supporting 
infrastructure-related projects grew during 2008–2010. Lately, there have been efforts to 
devote more resources to agriculture and social sectors.348The UAE’s Ministry of 
International Cooperation and Development (MICAD)  Foreign Aid Report for 2012’ shows  
that the UAE disbursed AED 5.83 bn (USD 1.43 bn) through 43 donor entities, the private 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
345In 2011, Saudi Arabia was the 22nd largest donor of official humanitarian aid. Saudi Arabia’s official development assistance (ODA) was 
equal to 0.9% of Saudi Arabia’s gross national income (GNI).Its GNI rank in 2011 was 19 of 214.   86.1% of Saudi Arabia’s official 
humanitarian aid was spent in fragile states.   78.4% of Saudi Arabia’s official humanitarian aid was spent in countries classified as long term 
recipients of humanitarian aid. 
346 In 2011, The UAE was the 17 the largest donor of official humanitarian aid. UAE’s official development assistance (ODA) was equal to 
0.2% of UAE’s gross national income (GNI). 51.5% of UAE’s official humanitarian aid was spent on fragile states. 17.2% of UAE’s official 
humanitarian aid was spent in countries classified as long term recipients of humanitarian aid. 
347 In 2011, Qatar was the 37 th largest donor of official humanitarian aid 2.Its GNI rank in 2011 was 47 of 214, 3.46.4% of Qatar’s official 
humanitarian aid was spent on fragile states. 
 4.48% of Qatar’s official humanitarian aid was spent in countries classified as long term recipients of humanitarian aid in 2011 
348 Coordination Secretariat of the Arab National and Regional Developmental Institutions informs that, total commitments of the eight Arab 
financial institutions raised significantly between the 2008–2010 period when compared to the pre-crisis period (2005–2007). Total 
commitments became approximately US$ 7 billion in 2010, as opposed to US$ 4.7 billion in 2007. The majority of the assistance made 
possible in the period of 2008–2010 came from three institutions: the Islamic Development Bank (36 percent), Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development (21 percent), and Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (13 percent). 
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sector and individuals in support of development, and humanitarian and charitable projects in 
137 countries and territories. I 87 percent of these funds were used for development projects 
overseas with the remaining 6.9 percent and 6.1 percent going towards humanitarian and 
charitable activities respectively. In 2012, the country’s official development assistance 
(ODA) reached AED 4.56 bn (USD 1.24 bn) or 78.2 percent of UAE’s foreign aid. This figure 
is a 118.2 percent increase over 2010 and 52.2 percent over 2011 (UAE Foreign Aid Report 
2012). 
 
Institutions of Arab Aid 
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) was established in 
1974 and is situated in Kuwait City (World Bank, 2010; AFESD, 2011). AFESD is the major 
multilateral Arab aid organization, and undertakes the mobilization of the Coordination 
Group, which acts as an umbrella organization for coordinating Gulf aid to the key 
multilateral and bilateral aid institutions (Momani and Ennis, 2012). The AFESD solely gives 
aid to Arab countries with the stated purpose of facilitating economic and social development, 
as well as advancing regional integration among Arab states (AFESD, 2011; World Bank, 
2010). As indicated in Figure 2, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are the two major countries 
providing financial and technical resources. It has to be noted that aid provided by the AFESD 
often takes the form of concessional loans and small technical assistance grants (Shushan and 
Marcoux, 2011). A second major organization is the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The 
IDB was established in 1975 and is located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It has 56 member states. 
The IDB was established primarily to finance “economic development and social progress” 
among member countries, as well as to aid Muslim communities. The IDB emphasizes that all 
of its activities must be conducted in accord with the jurisdiction of the Shari’ah (Islamic 
law), which strictly bans the practice of interest on financial transactions.349 
The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), based in Vienna, has been to 
pursuing developmental aid especially in the South–South solidarity (Shushan and Marcoux, 
2011; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). Most of OFID’s assistance mostly takes the form of 
concessional loans for development projects, balance of payment support, and trade financing. 
It also provides modest grants for technical assistance, food aid, research, and emergency 
humanitarian relief (World Bank, 2010; AFESD, 2011). While OFID is not an Arab-only 
organization (6 of its 12 current members are Arab states). Contributions from Arab countries 
account for approximately 65% of OFID’s direct operations account. Saudi Arabia is the 
largest donor (34.7%), and other Arab contributors include Kuwait (12.5%), Libya (6.9%), 
UAE (5.7%), Qatar (3.1%), and Iraq (1.7%) (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). Similar to 
OFID, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) has special focus on 
channeling aid to non-Arab African states.350 
Apart from multilateral agencies, bilateral forms of aid have been established 
especially via sovereign funds for KSA, Kuwait and UAE. These countries established their 
own national agencies in order to channel bilateral aid. For instance, the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development (KFAED) offers aid to recipients in the form of loans at 
concessional terms (World Bank, 2010; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). Similarly, the Abu 
Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) promotes sustainable economic development, 
alleviation of poverty, and provision of support for regional and international development 
initiatives (World Bank, 2010). The Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) provides loans to 
governments of developing countries to finance projects. When more systematically analyzed, 
                                                          
349 In 2008, the top 8 shareholders in the IDB funded 81% of the organization’s total shares; of these 6 were Arab countries which provided 
64.7% of the total. The single largest shareholder in the IDB, by far, was Saudi Arabia (24.4%), followed by these other Arab states: Libya 
(9.8%), Qatar (8.6%), Egypt (8.5%), UAE (6.9%), and Kuwait (6.5%) (AFESD, 2011; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). 
350 In the most recent period (2005–09), BADEA has offered concessional loans for periods of 18–30 years, at interest rates ranging from 1% 
to 4% per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, 2010). The organization has 18 Arab members, and the six highest 
subscribers control over 90% of the shares. They are: Saudi Arabia (24.5%), Libya (16.3%), Kuwait (15%), Iraq (14.3%), UAE (12.2%), and 
Qatar (8.2%). 
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most ODA from KSA, Kuwait, and UAE over the period 1995–2007 has been channeled 
through bilateral basis. While bilateral aid accounts for 89 percent of total ODA offered by 
these donors, for the same time period, multilateral sources constituted approximately four 
percent through Arab financial institutions, four percent through the World Bank, two percent 
through UN agencies, and just under one percent through the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) (World Bank, 2010; AFESD, 2011). These numbers suggest that the average ratio of 
multilateral to total ODA among Arab donors (13 percent) over the period 1973–2008 is less 
than half the DAC average (30 percent).351 
 In general, these characteristics illustrate that there has been significant changes in 
terms of the historically proven generosity of the Arab donors. The challenging task is to 
identify as figures 1 and 2 clearly illustrated, Arab development aid through various channels. 
(World Bank, 2010; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011).352It is, however, important to note that  
changes in the trends of Arab aid take place as well. A critical finding is that since 2000, 
generosity has declined for two of the bilateral donors—Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (World 
Bank, 2010). From the literature and available data, one can diagnose three major reasons 
behind the relatively decreasing levels of Arab development aid. Firstly, while bilateral Arab 
aid spending has remained fairly consistent since the 1980s, Arab donors have steadily 
increased multilateral aid commitments from $1 billion in 1986 to $3 billion by 2006. This 
rise in multilateral spending in relation to the relative stagnation of bilateral aid flows suggests 
that Arab donors have begun to replace bilateral programming with multilateral spending. 
According to Shushan and Marcoux (2011), the increase in multilateral commitments is not 
sufficient to compensate for the decline in generosity of bilateral aid, causing an overall 
decline in the generosity of Arab donors. Secondly, as a recent World Bank Report (2011) 
indicated, there is a possibility of the displacement of the Arab aid in the sense that Arab aid 
has been displaced by non-Arab aid. A third dimension pertains to increasing government 
expenditures by Arab donors (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). A fourth dimension is related 
to the relationship between oil prices and development aid. As Figure 4 clearly illustrates, the 
uncertainty in terms of the relationship between development aid and oil prices remains  a 
problematic one. Historically, peaks in Arab aid coincided with periods of increasing oil 
prices, however, recent trends illustrate that this correlation no longer holds. 
 
Section Three: Arab Development Aid and Governance; Challenges and Prospects 
 Throughout the decades, Arab donors have positioned themselves as clear proponents 
of the South-South model of aid giving. Heralded for their unwavering commitment to 
promoting partnership, participation, and solidarity with recipient countries, Arab donors have 
developed a strategy that embraces South-South priorities and adheres to international calls 
for stronger donor-recipient dialogue as a means to improve aid effectiveness. As Arab donors 
begin to widen the regional scope of their aid activities to include more countries beyond the 
Middle-East and North Africa, new prospects emerge for Arab donors to further assert 
themselves as major providers of South-South cooperation (World Bank, 2010). 
Over the past decade, the regional preferences of Arab donors have shifted (Ulrichsen, 
2012). As globalization deepened links between the Gulf States and the international system, 
high oil prices and increased demand for energy resources from emerging economies served 
to cast Arab states as leading global players within the international system.  With new 
geopolitical and geo-economic alignments emerging with changing global dynamics, Arab 
donors began to broaden the scope of their funding to include thickening ties with new 
Southern allies. 
At the bilateral level, funding from Arab donors is increasingly being directed towards 
poor and lower-middle income countries.  While Middle Eastern and North African countries 
                                                          
351 Kuwait had the largest average multilateral share at 20 percent for the entire period, about twice the shares of KSA and UAE. 
352“Generosity” in terms of aid divided by gross national income (GNI). 
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still receive the bulk of Arab donor funding, Arab donors have increasingly allocated larger 
portions of aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and Central Asia, mirroring newly 
increased diplomatic interactions with these regions as a result of the changing global power 
dynamics (Ulrichsen, 2012). In terms of multilateral flows, aid allocated through Arab 
multilateral institutions has increasingly been allocated on the basis of development needs, 
with Arab multilaterals focusing nearly two-fifths of financial recourses to IDA-eligible 
recipients and one-fourth to sub-Saharan countries (World Bank, 2010, p. 38).  Indeed, while 
bilateral aid spending has remained fairly consistent since the 1980s, Arab donors have 
steadily increased multilateral aid commitments from $1 billion in 1986 to $3 billion by 2006. 
Given the recent rise of the Gulf States within the international spectrum, the emphasis on 
needs based aid from Arab multilateral institutions may be representative of broader shifts 
towards increasing support for international goals and development targets (such as the 
Millennium Development Goals) by Arab donors seeking to solidify and assert their new 
global status. While Arab states still prioritize aid to regional counterparts, shifting trends in 
the allocation of Arab aid towards needs-based spending and regional diversification suggests 
that Arab donors may be increasingly prioritizing the development aspects of aid financing 
over geopolitical strategy and religious solidarity. 
However, it remains unclear whether the expansion of recipients of Arab aid is rooted 
in a fundamental shift in the development mindset of Arab donors or whether this new trend is 
grounded in the perceived expansion of opportunities in new regions.  At some level, similar 
shifts towards the redirection of aid away from traditional regional recipient countries appears 
to be emerging in the aid activities of other South-South donors. In 2006, China provided 44% 
of its aid expenditures to sub-Saharan Africa, while Brazil’s top three aid recipients consisted 
of the regionally diverse group of Haiti, Cape Verde, and East Timor (ECOSOC, 2008 p. 19). 
While the degree to which this shift in regional allocation preferences can be extended to 
include the broader range of Southern donors remains questionable, the redirection of Arab 
aid towards a more regionally diverse group of lower income countries is an exemplary trend 
that promises to contribute to the development of lowest income regions.  
At the same time, the broadening scope of Arab aid recipients raises concerns that new 
development linkages may further exacerbate issues of fragmentation within an already 
poorly coordinated international aid system. In general, the Coordination Group developed by 
Arab donors has provided a space to facilitate communication and cooperation among Arab 
aid agencies, and has largely been praised for its ability to design a clear set of policies and 
procedures that define best practices in project managements and promote harmonization 
between Group members.  Indeed, under the umbrella of the Coordination Group, Arab 
donors have pledged to continue to pursue the coordination and harmonization of aid 
spending and priorities both between Group members, and with the wider development 
community, through reaffirming commitment to the principles for aid effectiveness outlined 
in the Paris Declaration (OFID, 2011).  
At the same time, international concerns over fragmentation could be addressed 
through improved cooperation between traditional DAC, emerging, and Arab donors. The 
sectorial priorities that drive Arab and emerging donors tend to differ from DAC donor 
priorities. Arab and emerging donors, focus aid more heavily towards infrastructural projects, 
specifically towards improving transportation, providing energy, and access to water, while 
DAC donors tend to provide aid for service provision (education and health care), governance 
improvement (via budget support), and for actions relating to debt and economic stability. 
Stronger commitments following inclusive international discourse on global aid challenges 
could help to improve the coordination of aid activities where such priorities and projects 
overlap (Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). 
However, a large part of the ability of donors to counter the potential for 
fragmentation to hinder development efforts, stems from the degree to which the international 
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community can foster meaningful discussions and representative spaces that allow actors 
outside of the traditional DAC-donor community to participate and contribute to the creation 
of policies and agendas for further coordination.  In acknowledging that issues of 
fragmentation cannot be addressed in the absence of donor involvement, the 2011, fourth 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan was the first of the aid effectiveness 
meetings to actively include non-DAC and civil society donors. While the degree to which the 
Busan agenda has sparked any real improvements to international development coordination 
remains unclear, Arab donors, who were well represented at Busan, appear to have supported 
efforts towards strengthening donor coordination and have welcomed a dialogue with 
Northern and Southern donors to improve the effectiveness of development finance (Atwood, 
2012). 
Additionally, Arab donors have supported larger efforts towards aid effectiveness and 
‘best practices’ in aid allocation through providing untied aid (Momani and Ennis, 2012).  
While many DAC donors have historically tied foreign aid to the liberalization of investment 
law for donor companies, or to the purchase of donor country goods and services, Gulf States 
have limited the extraction of material gain from aid spending.  In terms of the degree to 
which Arab donors provided untied aid, which Momani and Ennis (2012) note has been a 
common practice accompanying Arab aid since 1979, Arab donors appear to be historic 
leaders in providing aid that supports recipient autonomy and interests. 
However, an important challenge preventing further improvements in the international 
coordination of aid efforts is grounded in governance challenges, particularly the ability and 
willingness for Arab donors to improve the transparency of bilateral aid activities. According 
to Shushan and Marcoux (2011), barriers to the transparency of Arab aid appear in two main 
forms.  Firstly, inconsistencies in annual aid data reporting have led to large gaps in aid 
statistics. While Arab multilateral institutions have tended to provide more comprehensive 
documentation of aid spending, bilateral donors have been less consistent. From 1988 to 1997, 
for example, the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Fund (ADFD) failed to report any aid statistics. 
Additionally, bilateral Arab donors generally do not report certain types of aid spending, such 
as debt forgiveness, further inhibiting the transparency of Arab aid spending.   
At the most basic level, the lack of transparency surrounding Arab aid spending, as 
witnessed through missing aid data, makes it difficult to properly gauge the true extent of 
Arab aid spending and limits international understanding of Arab aid activities. To some 
degree, the poor reporting of Arab aid statistics prevents further cooperation between DAC 
and Arab aid systems by limiting the ability for the larger aid community to understand the 
differences and similarities between new and traditional donors. As a result, the poor 
reporting practices concerning Arab aid spending could prevent efforts to improve aid 
efficiency by obscuring trends in aid amounts and delivery that remain central to discussions 
of aid effectiveness. On this point, Arab donors could make large contributions to global aid 
effectiveness programs through improving aid data reporting and increasing the transparency 
of current and future aid spending. 
Secondly, the transparency of bilateral Arab aid is also limited by the tendency for 
Arab donors to make additional aid contributions above and beyond regular aid spending 
(Shushan and Mercoux, 2011).Termed ‘political aid’, Villanger (2007) and Shushan and 
Mercoux (2011), contend that some Arab donors supplement development aid spending with 
aid contributions distributed through national Ministries of Finance.  A distinction should be 
made between ‘political aid’ and politically motivated ‘development aid’, where development 
aid, while still susceptible to the geo-political interests of donor governments remains geared 
towards development-based initiatives, whereas political aid, by virtue of being allocated 
through finance ministries rather than national development funds, may not be explicitly 
targeted towards enhancing ‘development’ per se. While some countries use political aid 
transfers with greater frequency then others, Saudi Arabia for example has been said to 
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conduct a large portion of aid activities through its Ministry of Finance. The point remains 
that the distribution of aid through political channels further limits the transparency of Arab 
aid spending.  Indeed, according to Villanger (2007), it is “extremely difficult to get 
information about the magnitudes, purposes, and usage” (p. 13) of political aid flows.  In this 
sense, the distribution of political aid becomes a clear limit to the transparency of Arab aid 
spending, as the relative opaqueness of political aid further restricts international 
understanding of Arab aid spending. 
 Additionally, a series of charitable donations by Gulf rulers has also contributed to the 
relative ‘fuzziness’ of Arab aid by blurring the lines between public and private spending 
(Ennis and Momani, 2012). Sheik Mohamed, ruler of Dubai and Prime Minister of the UAE, 
for example, has ‘personally’ established aid campaigns and has provided several large 
donations to various initiatives. Essentially, the problem with such contributions is the 
difficulty associated with disentangling it  from public state finances, where ‘private’ 
donations could be financed from public revenues.  As a result, the ability to accurately report 
Arab aid expenditure is further confused, adding to reporting challenges and further hindering 
the transparency of Arab aid.  
However, recent improvements towards increasing the transparency of Arab aid 
suggest that other norm-based explanations may also account for the historically low-
transparency of Arab aid.  Indeed, Shushan and Mercoux (2011) contend that part of the 
opaqueness of Arab aid may stem from the relatively limited exposure Arab donors, and non-
DAC donors more broadly, have had to DAC developed aid norms.  This rationale suggests 
that as Arab donors begin to increase interaction with DAC donors and the broader aid 
community, such exposure may prompt Arab donors to reform aid practices in efforts towards 
further integration and to position Arab donors within the broader aid community. 
Indeed, in 2010, the United Arab Emirates, for the first time, released a whole-of-
government report on its aid flows and associated activities (OECD-DAC, 2011). The formal 
reporting of aid statistics marked a significant point of progress towards the monitoring of 
non-DAC donors, as the UAE became the first country outside of the DAC to report aid 
activities in such detail. In the absence of significant changes to UAE governance, the 
willingness of the UAE to report aid data to the OECD may be linked to greater exposure to 
DAC practices and larger efforts by the UAE to engage with the international aid community 
through adopting DAC norms.  
In addition to issues of transparency, the effectiveness of Arab aid could also be 
improved through efforts to decrease the volatility of Arab aid spending (Shushan and 
Mercoux, 2011). Indeed, the heavy reliance on oil revenues as a source of financing for 
bilateral aid spending has raised concerns  about the volatility and sustainability of Arab 
financial assistance. While some have noted that  Arab financial institutions tend to be well-
capitalized and conservatively managed, making Arab financial institutions relatively reliable 
providers of financial resources, clear links between the volume of Arab aid flows and the 
cycle of oil production, remain somewhat worrisome, particularly given the recent increase in 
Arab flows associated with the rising prices of petroleum. 
Indeed, issues of volatility are particularly pronounced when prefaced against Arab 
donor preferences towards longer-term aid arrangements over short-term development 
projects. Given that long-term projects tend to be funded via disbursements over the project 
timeline, program effectiveness could be severely disrupted by discrepancies between donor 
commitments and disbursements as affected by oil revenue cycles. According to Desai and 
Kharas (2010), the failure to meet aid commitments through shortfalls in disbursement 
amounts could force recipients to cut planned expenditure or raise domestic taxes, while the 
basic inability to fund planned tasks limits program effectiveness and threatens development 
progress. To improve the overall effectiveness of Arab aid, donors should consider striving to 
improve the stability and predictability of aid outflows in efforts to avoid large drops in aid 
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disbursement correlated to declining oil prices. 
 
Section Four: Qatar Development Fund 
 According to the Global Humanitarian353 Assistance data, in 2010, Qatar had the 
fastest growing economy in the world, with a real GDP growth of 19.4%, and it is expected to 
continue growth at a double-digit rate for the next few years (Economy Watch). The country’s 
Gross national income (GNI) reached an all-time peak of US$169 billion in 2011 (World 
Bank Data). Qatar governmental revenue was US$ 44 billion, total assistance US$729 
million, and humanitarian assistance US$12 million. In 2011, Qatar was the 37th largest 
donor of official humanitarian assistance with a GNI rank of 47 out of 214. 46.4% of Qatar’s 
official humanitarian assistance was spent on fragile states. 48% of Qatar’s official 
humanitarian assistance was spent in countries classified as long term recipients of 
humanitarian assistance. In 2012, Qatar gave US$36.4 million in humanitarian assistance. 
Qatar’s share of humanitarian contributions amongst the Gulf State donors increased from 4% 
to 20%, with the majority of this going towards the humanitarian crisis in Syria. (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance – Qatar)According to the World Bank Index, in Qatar, the value for 
net official development assistance (ODA) and official aid received (current US$) was 
$3,630,000.00 as of 2004. Over the past 41 years, the value of this indicator has fluctuated 
between ($20,000.00) in 1963 and $6,340,000.00 in 1999. (World Bank, Index mundi-Qatar). 
According to the Qatar Foreign Aid Report 2012, during the period 2006-2012, Qatar 
Development Fund was $10,862,361,353 in Governmental Aid, and $4,278,126,789 in Non-
Governmental Aid (Qatar Foreign Aid Report 2012). It should be noted that Qatar’s 
increasing visibility and reputation unfolding with a unique state diplomacy, acting as a 
diplomatic mediator with an unconventional repertoire (Cooper and Momani, 2012) fuels 
more optimism pertaining to Qatar’s potential contribution to international development. 
According to George Mavrotas and EspenVillanger, strategic donors’ effort to pressurize a 
recipient to support the foreign policy goals of the donor in the decision making process, in a 
multilateral organization, is endogenously determined. (Mavrotas and Villanger, 2006). 
Habib Toumi explains that between 2005 and 2009, Qatar allocated $2 billion in aid to 
poor countries through various global organizations. The assistance played a key role in the 
country’s foreign policy and international cooperation (Habib Toumi, 2010). The Department 
of International Development at the country’s foreign ministry is quoted to have said that“the 
total developmental and humanitarian aid, provided by the State of Qatar (governmental and 
non-governmental) in the years 2010 -2011 amounted to QR 5,337,430,71, distributed to 108 
countries worldwide.” The aid took many forms such as contributions, donations, materials, 
in-kind and technical grants as well as support of humanitarian or developmental projects. The 
reach of Qatar's humanitarian assistance has widened to include distant countries. It is not 
limited to the Arab countries in the region or the Muslim countries that are within 
geographical proximity to it. Qatar provided emergency aid during a number of major 
disasters such as the floods in Pakistan and the Haiti and Japan earthquakes. It assisted the 
drought-hit Horn of Africa, in addition to Palestine and Darfur, which suffer from 
humanitarian crises. Qatar’s launch of the "Hope For" Initiative to increase the effectiveness 
of using military resources in disaster relief also speaks to the reach of its development and 
humanitarian aid (Arab Humanitarian Portal). In addition, Qatar and Morocco have signed an 
aid deal worth $1.25 billion as part of a five-year package of financial assistance extended by 
wealthy Gulf States to the North African kingdom to help it weather 'Arab Spring' protests. 
Four Gulf States - Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - agreed in 2012 
to provide aid worth a total $5 billion to Morocco in the period 2012-2017 to build up its 
infrastructure, strengthen its economy and foster tourism. Each of the four countries has 
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committed $1.25 billion to Morocco for the whole five year period (Reuters, 2013). 
A recent analysis of Arab development aid has to take into account the recent 
developments, especially the establishment of the Qatar Development Fund (QDF) initiated 
by Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser. Qatar’s rising development related efforts have been 
addressing many of the problems and deficiencies of Arab development aid that have been 
presented above. Although KSA, Kuwait and UAE have been the primary instigators of Arab 
development aid historically, Qatar’s role has recently became more prominent especially by 
offering a multi-faceted institutional and strategic roadmap. This roadmap is instituted 
through a constellation of various Qatari institutions and initiatives and overall Qatar has been 
bringing a new wave of transformation and changing contours  to Arab development aid. 
QDF and its structure provide optimism especially in relation to the objective of 
directing 50% of QDF’s grants to be allocated for educational purposes. Although at early 
stages, we argue that the establishment of QDF provides a viable beast for the evolution of 
Arab development aid. More specifically, QDF will build on the already established practices 
of Qatari international initiatives, for example, Qatari NGOs foreign aid and assistance during 
the course of 2010-2011 accounts for approximately QR 1.6 billion and 24% of this amount is 
spent only for educational purposes while the development field followed with a share of 
18.89% (Al Diplomacy, 2012). Inspired by Qatar National Vision 2030, Qatar’s overall 
development assistance reached QR 5.3 billion with 108 countries benefitting. Overall, QDF, 
Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar Foundation and Qatar Investment Authority are 
reshaping the contours of the new dynamics of Arab development aid, which will have 
stronger and more effective implications on attaining better governance mechanisms not only 
in the Middle East, but also in all of the Arab aid recipient countries.354 
In 1992, Qatar Charitable Society (QCS) was established under the law governing 
private associations and institutions in the State of Qatar. QCS took on an international 
character  throughout the world, particularly in Africa and Asia. In 2012, the total aid 
provided by QCS stood at QR 3887,951,006, offered to 41 countries. In 2011 and 2012, the 
total Qatari non-governmental external aid was QR 1,800,127,317 (Qatar Foreign Aid Report, 
2012). These aid constitutes the funds from the Zakah of Qatari citizens and the country’s 
Awqaf.  
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